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Abstract: This paper measures the capital markets’ reaction to merger 
announcements within the announcement month using the sample of 37 mergers 
from USA. Research findings indicate that targets earn positive average abnormal 
returns of 19 percent that is statistically significant, whereas acquirers earn positive 
average abnormal returns of 5 percent that is not statistically significant. The 
weighted average of the abnormal returns to acquirer and targets is 7 percent and 
statistically significant. These results indicate that the gains around the merger 
announcements reflect synergetic gains, not the wealth transfer from acquirer 
shareholders to target’s. The method of payment, business overlap degree of 
acquirer’s and target’s industries and the price-to-book ratio of acquirers 
significantly affect the division of the synergetic gains between the shareholders of 
target and acquirer firms.  
 
Keywords: Mergers, Abnormal Returns, Event Studies, Method of Payment, Price-
to-Book Ratios 
 
Özet: Bu çalışmada ABD ekonomisine ait 37 şirket birleşmesi örnek alınarak 
sermaye pazarlarının şirket birleşmeleri haberine tepkisi analiz edilmiştir. 
Araştırmada satın alınan firma hisse sahiplerinin birleşme haberinin ilan edildiği 
ayda istatiksel olarak anlamlı ortalama % 19 pozitif getiri elde ettiğini göstermiştir. 
Satın alan firma hisse sahiplerinin getirisinin ise ortalama % 5 ve istatiksel olarak 
anlamsızdır. Satın alınan ve satın alan firma hisse sahiplerinin getirilerinin ağırlıklı 
ortalaması % 7  olup, istatistiksel olarak anlamlıdır. Bu sonuç şirket birleşmeleri 
sırasında oluşan getirilerin bir sinerjik kazanç olduğunu, satın alan firma hisse 
sahiplerinden satın alınan firma hisse sahiplerine yapılan bir varlık transferi 
olmadığını göstermektedir. Ödeme yöntemi, birleşme stratejisi ve satın alan 
firmanın piyasa değeri/defter değeri oranının birleşme ilanı sırasında oluşan 
getirilerin satın alan ve satın alınan firmalar arasında bölünmesinde önemli etkenler 
olduğu  saptanmıştır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Şirket Birleşmeleri, Anormal Getiri, Ödeme Yöntemi, Piyasa 
Değeri/Defter Değeri Oranı  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The announcement period abnormal returns is the indicator of the market’s reaction 
to merger announcements and supposed to bear informational content about the 
surviving firm’s postmerger performance if markets are efficient. One stream in the 
financial literature claims that the gains to target shareholders represent wealth 
transfers from acquiring firms’ shareholders and not necessarily synergetic gains 
(Roll (1986)), while another stream claims that mergers result in the synergetic 
gains. The overwhelming majority of the financial literature supports the latter claim 
by providing evidence that targets of successful mergers earn significantly positive 
abnormal returns on the announcement of the offers, whereas the returns to 
acquirers are on average zero ((Jensen and Ruback (1983), Bradley, Desai and Kim 
(1983), Desai and Kim (1988), Nathan and O’Keefe (1989)).  
 
The primary objective of this paper is to study the magnitude and sign of the 
abnormal returns in the merger announcements. I also study the factors that 
determine the division of these gains between acquirer and targets. Specifically, I 
test whether method of payment, business overlap degree of acquirer’s and target’s 
industry, and the acquirers past performance record affect the magnitude and 
division of the gains between acquirer and targets. For this purpose, I collected a 
sample of 37 mergers between U.S. public industrial firms completed between 1995 
and 1997. I calculate abnormal returns using the market model and test the abnormal 
performance.  
 
The research findings indicate that targets’ shareholders gain significantly positive 
abnormal returns around the merger announcements, whereas acquirers’ 
shareholders gain positive, but not statistically significant abnormal returns. The 
combined abnormal returns are significantly positive which indicates that the gains 
to target shareholders do not reflect wealth transfer from acquirer shareholders and 
additional value is created in the announcement period. The research findings are 
not conflicting with the existing researches in the financial literature. 
 
The method of payment is found to be important determinant of the allocation of 
abnormal returns between acquirer and targets. Markets favor cash-financed bids, 
whereas mixed-financed bids gets lower returns.  
 
The weighted average abnormal returns in high overlap mergers are higher than in 
low overlap mergers. However, low overlap merger targets gain higher abnormal 
returns than high overlap merger targets. It is most probably due to the high 
premiums paid to target firms in low overlap mergers. The high acquirer returns in 
high overlap mergers can be interpreted as the reflection of the market’s belief in the 
merger’s success. 
 
Acquirers with price-to-book ratios higher than their industry median (growth firms) 
are viewed in the market not much value-creating deals. Therefore, the market’s 
reaction to their merger bids is less favorable; the target, acquirer and total abnormal 
returns in these merger bids are less than those involving acquirers with price-to-
book ratios lower than the industry median (value firms). This finding indicates that 
the bidders past performance record do not affect market’s reaction to mergers. This 
result is in contradiction with the “performance extrapolation hypothesis” by Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998) who claim that the mergers involving “growth” acquirers are 
favored well by the market. 
 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes sample and 
data used in the study. Section 3 describes the research methodology. Section 4 
reports and discusses the stock returns at merger announcements. Section 5 
compares the research findings with the existing researches in financial literature. 
Section 6 gives a brief conclusion.  
 
 
II. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
The sample of mergers is retrieved from Mergerstat database. Total number of 458 
mergers is reported in this dataset according to the following criteria:  
 
(1) There is a merger offer to purchase stock in the company.  
(2) The details of the offer appear in Mergerstat.  
(3) The merger deal is announced between 01.06.1995 and 31.12.1997 
(4) Transactions valued at less than $ 350 million were eliminated. Banks, 
insurance, and railroad companies were eliminated, since they are subject 
to different regulations. 
(5) Country of the acquirers and targets is USA. Acquisitions by foreign 
concerns were eliminated. 
(6) The deals that did not obtain complete ownership of the target were 
eliminated.  
(7) The mergers that were later cancelled were eliminated.  
(8) The size of target should exceed 5% of the size of acquirer. Target firm 
size is computed from Compustat as the market value of common stock 
plus the net debt and preferred stock at the beginning of the year before the 
acquisition.  
(9) The acquirer’s and target’s financial and market data information appears 
in Compustat (North American) Database.   
 
These selection criteria reduced the initial sample of 458 merger cases to 37. The 
source of the financial and market data is Compustat (North American) Database.  
 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
3.1. Research Methodology 
 
The empirical evidence indicates that shareholders of target firms realize large 
positive abnormal returns in the completed mergers. The evidence on the rewards to 
acquirer firms is mixed, but the weight of the evidence suggests that zero returns 
earned by successful acquirer firms in mergers. Since targets gain and acquirers do 
not appear to lose, the evidence suggests that mergers create value (Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), Nathan and O’Keefe (1989), Desai and Kim (1988) Bradley, Desai 
and Kim (1983)). 
 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) synthesize the empirical evidence in the financial 
literature and find that abnormal returns associated with successful corporate 
mergers are on average 20% for targets and zero for acquirers.  
 
The information content of a merger event is measured as the abnormal common 
stock return relative to the aggregate market return. In this study, the abnormal 
returns are calculated for the announcement month of the mergers. Abnormal 
returns is measured as the market-model prediction error (PE), which is an estimate 
of the abnormal return of for security j on event month defined as: 
 
PEj  = R j  –  E(Rj )     [1]  
 
Where ,  
 
Rj t  = market return of the securities over announcement month which is measured 
by summing close price at the end of the announcement month plus dividends per 
share within the announcement month, divided by the close price of the month 
preceding the announcement month.  
 
E(Rj)  = expected rate of return on security i for the announcement month. It is 
estimated using Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). CAPM is used to determine 
the expected rate of return for an asset at a given level of risk.  Essentially, I 
calculate the expected rate of return for security j in the announcement month as: 
 
E(R j )  =Rr f  +β (Rm -  Rr f )     [2] 
 
Where, 
 
Rr f   =   Risk free rate (measured by 3 month USA Treasury bill rate)  
Rm  =   Total market return in the event month (measured by return of the 
Standard & 
Poor's 
500 Index) 
β  =  Sensitivity of a company's stock price to the overall fluctuation in 
the market 
return  
 
Combined abnormal return is calculated by weighting the target and bidder returns 
by their relative sizes in the beginning of the year of merger announcement. Firm 
sizes is calculated by the market value of assets, which is the market value of equity 
plus the book values of net debt and preferred stock measured at the beginning of 
the year. 
 
I conduct significance tests using standard errors following Jensen and Ruback 
(1983). The t statistic is calculated as: 
 
S
t
NPE
 j      
 [3.3]  
 
where,  
 
PEj  = market-model prediction error 
N  = number of observations 
S = standard deviation 
 
 
I also use a binomial test to determine whether the proportion (p) of firms 
experiencing changes in a given direction is greater than would be expected by 
chance (typically testing whether p = 0.5). This test will provide information about 
which proportion of firms changed performance in the same direction and 
significance of this change.  
 
3.2. Subsample Analyses 
 
Financial literature suggests that market reaction to the merger announcement is 
dependent of merger process characteristics. Therefore, the following subsets are 
analyzed besides of the whole sample.  
 
3.2.1. Method of Payment Subsets  
 
The method of payment is very important in determining abnormal returns, since 
they reveal information to the market. There is evidence, consistent with Myers and 
Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection problem with equity issuance, that acquirer and 
target returns for stock offers on average lower than for cash offers. Asquith, 
Bruner, and Mullins (1987) have found that announcement period returns to 
acquirers in mergers are significantly more negative for acquisitions with stock than 
those financed with cash. Huang and Walkling (1987) find that acquisitions 
involving cash payments yield significantly higher returns to target shareholders. 
The explanations they provide is that target shareholders require higher payment for 
having to recognize taxable gains immediately in cash transactions. 
 
Four key factors are important in choosing the means of payment in takeovers.  
 
1. Stocks are preferred since value of equity frequently used in limiting 
overpayment 
2. Cash is an indicator of high valuation and equity is an indicator of low 
valuation.   
3. The equity is used to exploit the target’s private information.  
4. Equity has a tax advantage.  
 
Martin (1996) shows that the form of payment is partly endogenous to the mode of 
acquisition. Mergers are often financed with acquirer’s stock whereas tender offers 
are predominantly cash financed. Hansen (1987) develops a theory under 
asymmetric information. According to his theory, when target firm knows its value 
better than potential acquirer, the acquirer will prefer to offer stock, which has 
desirable contingent-pricing characteristics, rather than cash. Either tax effects or 
asymmetric information on the acquiring side can make the acquirer’s choice 
acquisitions a nontrivial one. With asymmetry on both sides of the transaction, 
acquisitions signaling equilibrium develop whereby the target uses both exchange 
medium offered and the amount of any stock offer as signals of the acquiring firm’s 
value. 
 
Following financial literature, I hypothesize the highest abnormal returns for targets 
in cash-financed mergers among all other subsets.  
 
The sample is divided into three subsets according to the method of payment. 
Equity-financed mergers subset includes cases where only the acquirer’s common 
stock was used to pay for an acquisition. Cash-financed mergers subset includes 
cases where only cash was used for payment. All other cases in which the payment 
terms were neither pure stock nor pure cash are classified under mixed-payment 
mergers subset. In some cases, both stock and cash were used and in other cases 
cash and senior securities were used. Equity-financed subset includes 23 (62%) out 
of 37 mergers are, whereas 9 (24) cases are cash-financed and 5 (14%) cases are 
mixed-financed. 
 
 
3.2.2. Business Overlap Subsets  
 
Business overlap of merging firms comes to be important determinant of the 
market’s expectations about improvements in the postmerger performance.  Jensen 
(1986) suggest that conglomerate mergers are less likely to succeed, because 
managers of acquiring firms are not familiar with the target industry or they waste 
free cash flow on bad acquisitions. Porter (1987) finds that over 50% of the 
acquisitions made by 33 conglomerate acquirers in "new" or unrelated industries 
were later divested.  
 
Following financial literature, it is logical to hypothesize low short-term abnormal 
returns for acquirers in the low overlap mergers, since the acquiring firm is 
apparently unfamiliar with the target’s industry. However, target shareholders’ gains 
should be greater, since target firms are usually offered larger premiums in this type 
of mergers..  
 
I classify mergers as those with high and low business overlap between the target 
and acquiring firms. High overlap mergers are merger cases between those acquirer 
and target firms whose at least three first SIC Code numbers are the same, whereas 
remaining mergers are classified as low overlap mergers. Sample analysis shows 
that 21 (57%) out of 37 mergers are high overlap mergers, whereas 16 (43%) cases 
are low overlap mergers. 
 
 
3.2.3. Value-Growth Subsets  
 
Rau and Vermaelen (1995) developed the performance extrapolation hypothesis, 
which claims the market overextrapolates the past performance of the acquirer when 
it assesses the value of an acquisition. At the same time, managers and other 
decision makers (such as shareholders and the board of directors) who have to 
approve an acquisition, indirectly receive feedback on the quality of the acquirer’s 
management from the market.  Rau and Vermaelen argue that in companies with 
low book-to-market ratios (‘glamour’ firms), managers are more likely to 
overestimate their own abilities to manage an acquisition. This argument is 
consistent with the hubris argument developed by Roll (1986).  Indeed, glamour 
firms are firms with high past stock returns and high past growth in cash flow and 
earnings, which should presumably strengthen the management’s belief in its own 
actions. Moreover, other stakeholders in these firms, such as the board of directors 
and large shareholders, are more likely to give the management the benefit of the 
doubt and approve its acquisitions plans. On the other hand, in companies whose 
management has a poor track of acquisition, such as companies with high book-to-
market ratios (‘value’ stocks), managers, directors, and large shareholders will be 
more prudent before approving acquisitions major transaction that may well 
determine the survival of the company. Because these acquisitions are not motivated 
by hubris, they should create shareholder value rather than destroy it.  The 
performance extrapolation hypothesis also assumes that the market only gradually 
reassesses the quality of the acquirer as the results of the acquisition become clear. 
Hence, in the short run, i.e., around the announcement of the acquisition, glamour 
acquirers should experience higher abnormal returns than value acquirers, while in 
the long run this performance will reverse.  
 
In order to test the performance extrapolation hypothesis’s predictions in the short-
term, I classify mergers into two separate subsets based on acquirers’ price to book 
ratios relative to their industry median in the year before the announcement of the 
acquisition. If acquirer companies’ price to book ratio is higher than industry’s 
median price to book ratio book, the merger case is classified as ‘growth’ merger, 
otherwise as “value” merger. As a result of this ranking, 11 (30%) mergers appeared 
to be ‘value’ mergers and 26 (70%) acquirers as ‘growth’ mergers. 
 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section I present and discuss my empirical results for the full sample of 
mergers and subsamples. I first present and discuss my empirical results for the 
complete sample of 37 mergers. Then I discuss my results for the following 
subsamples of my data: cash financed versus mixed financed versus equity-financed 
mergers; high overlap versus low overlap mergers; value versus growth mergers. 
For each of these partitions, I examine and report (in the text and in Table 1) 
whether each subsample of firms experience abnormal returns around the merger 
announcement date.  
 
a. The Whole Sample Analysis  
 
Consistent with the research predictions, target firms experience large abnormal 
returns than acquirers. The average (median) abnormal return for the targets is 19 
percentage points (19 percent) and 86 percent of all targets experience positive 
abnormal returns. The t-statistics and binomial test z-statistics is significant at 1 
percent significance level.  
 
Acquirer companies experience positive, but insignificant abnormal returns.  The 
average (median) abnormal return for the targets is 5 percentage points (1 percent) 
and only 57 percent of all acquirers experience positive abnormal returns. The t-
statistics and binomial test z-statistics are not significant at conventional levels. 
 
Combined abnormal return, which is calculated by weighting the target and acquirer 
returns by their relative sizes in the beginning of the year of announcement, is 
significantly positive.  The average (median) abnormal combined return is 7 
percentage points (5 percent) and 70 percent of all mergers experience positive 
combined abnormal returns. The t-statistics and binomial test z-statistics is 
significant at 5 percent significance level.  
 
These results suggest that markets react favorably to mergers and mergers create 
additional value. The value is created, not transferred, since significant abnormal 
returns to targets do not come at the expense of acquirer shareholders. 
 
 
b. The Subsamples Analysis  
 
i. Method of Payment Subsets  
 
Since method of payment reveals information to the market, acquirer and target 
returns for equity-financed deals are predicted to be on average lower than for cash 
offers. 
 
The empirical results are in the same line with the research predictions. Cash-
financed mergers experience higher average and median abnormal returns in all 
categories (target, acquirer and combined). The average (median) target abnormal 
return is 27 percent (32 percent) in cash-financed mergers, whereas it is 16 percent 
(19 percent) abnormal returns for equity-financed targets and 20 percent (19 
percent) in mixed-financed mergers. The percentages of targets that experience 
positive abnormal returns are 89, 83, and 100 percent for cash, equity, and mixed-
financed merger targets respectively. The t-statistics and binomial test z-statistics 
are significant at 1 percent significance level for equity-financed subsamples. Since 
the number of observations is less than 10, we didn’t employ statistical tests for 
cash-financed and mixed-financed mergers.  
 
Cash-financed merger acquirers experience higher abnormal returns than equity-
financed and mixed-financed mergers. An interesting result is the market’s negative 
reaction to mixed-financed merger acquirers. Mixed-financed merger acquirers 
experience average 2 percentage point negative abnormal returns, whereas median 
change is zero. This result suggests (not conclusive, because of small number of 
cases) that the market does not favor mixed-financed mergers.    
 
The combined abnormal returns are positive for all subsets, though cash-financed 
mergers experience higher abnormal returns. The t-statistics are significant at 5 
percent significance level for equity-financed mergers. Because of small number of 
observations, I am unable to conduct significance tests for cash-financed and mixed-
financed mergers.  
 
ii. Business Overlap Subsets  
 
Following financial literature, low short-term abnormal returns are hypothesized for 
acquirers in the low-overlap mergers, since the acquiring firm is apparently 
unfamiliar with the target’s industry. However, targets should experience greater 
abnormal returns perhaps, because of larger premiums offered to targets. 
 
The research findings approve research predictions. Low overlap targets experience 
higher average and median abnormal returns. The average (median) target abnormal 
return is 25 percent (22 percent) in low overlap mergers, whereas high overlap 
targets experience average (median) 14 percent (19 percent) abnormal returns. 94 
percent of low overlap targets experience positive combined abnormal returns, 
whereas this ratio is 81 percent for high overlap targets. The t-statistics and binomial 
test z-statistics are significant at 1 percent significance level for both subsamples. 
 
Acquirer shareholders gain more abnormal returns in high overlap merger subset 
than in low overlap merger subset. Low overlap acquirers experience average 
(median) 1 percentage points (1 percent) abnormal returns, whereas high overlap 
acquirers experience average (median) 8 percent (4 percent) abnormal returns. The 
percentage of acquirers that experience positive combined abnormal returns are 
somewhat equal in both subsets; 57 percent of high overlap acquirers and 56 percent 
of low overlap acquirers. The t-statistics and binomial test z-statistics are not 
significant at conventional levels for both subsamples. 
 
The combined abnormal returns for high overlap acquirers are greater on average 
and median than that of low overlap acquirers. Low overlap mergers experience 
average (median) 5 percentage points (5 percent) abnormal returns, whereas high 
overlap mergers experience average (median) 9 percent (6 percent) abnormal 
returns. However, the percentage of mergers that experience positive combined 
abnormal returns are 75 percent in high overlap mergers, whereas this ratio is 67 
percent in low overlap mergers. The t-statistics for low overlap mergers are 
significant at 5 percent significance level, whereas binomial test z-statistics is 
significant at 10 percent significance level. The t-statistics and binomial test z-
statistics is not significant at conventional levels for high overlap mergers. Higher 
standard deviation in high overlap mergers has caused insignificant results.  
 
iii. Value-Growth Subsets  
 
Higher acquirer, target, and combined abnormal returns are reported for value 
mergers than for growth mergers. Value targets experience on average (median) 8 
percentage points (4 percent) more abnormal returns. An interesting point is that all 
of the value merger targets experience positive abnormal returns, whereas only 81 
percent of growth merger acquirers experience positive abnormal returns. The t-
statistics and binomial test z-statistics are significant at 1 percent significance level 
for target abnormal returns in both subsets.  
 
Value acquirers experience average (median) 16 percentage points (4 percent) 
abnormal returns. However, growth acquirers experience on average zero abnormal 
returns. 64 percent of value merger acquirers experience positive abnormal returns, 
whereas only 54 percent of growth merger acquirers experience positive abnormal 
returns.   
 
One of the surprising results of the study is the significant abnormal return for the 
growth acquirers. Growth merger combined abnormal returns are on average 
(median) 3 percentage points (5 percent) abnormal returns. Though, value mergers 
experience higher average and median abnormal returns, the percentage of mergers 
that experience positive abnormal returns is higher in the growth merger subset (73 
percent) than value merger subset (64) percent. This result is somewhat surprising, 
since value mergers showed better abnormal returns in all other categories. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The research findings generally support the research predictions and in the same line 
with the previous researches in the financial literature. The announcement period 
abnormal returns to targets appear to be significantly positive, whereas acquirer 
shareholders gain positive, but not statistically significant abnormal returns. The 
combined abnormal returns are significantly positive which indicates that the gains 
of target shareholders do not reflect wealth transfer from acquirer shareholders to 
targets.  
 
The transaction characteristics (method of payment), acquirer and target 
characteristics (business overlap of merging firms, value-growth status of acquirer, 
size of mergers) are found to be important factors in the allocation of abnormal 
returns to acquirer and targets. Subsample analyses show that the method of 
payment affects the magnitude of the gains. The acquirer and target shareholders of 
the cash mergers experience higher gains than those of equity-financed and mixed-
financed mergers. Business overlap degree of the acquirer and targets affects mainly 
the division of the gains between acquirer and target shareholders. High overlap 
mergers result in higher average abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders, 
whereas low overlap mergers result in higher gains for target shareholders. 
Combined abnormal returns are significantly positive for low overlap mergers. My 
results also provide support to the performance extrapolation hypothesis. It seems 
that the market are aware that glamour firms could be infected by hubris and 
therefore, do not favor their merger deals. Lower acquirer, target, and combined 
abnormal returns are observed for the mergers involving acquirers with high price-
to-book ratios.  
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Table 1 
Summary of Results from Tests of Abnormal Returns for the Full and Subsamples of Mergers 
This table presents empirical results for the full and sub samples of mergers. For each row I give the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, 
and standard deviation of the abnormal returns, and a test of significance of abnormal returns. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose 
abnormal returns are positive, as well as a test of significance of this ratio. Significance levels for subsets with total number of cases less than 10 are not 
reported. 
Variables N 
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Abnormal 
Return 
Standard 
Deviation 
t-statistics 
 
Percentage of 
Firms with 
Positive 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Z-Statistics 
for 
Significance 
of Binomial 
Test 
Total Sample         
Target 37 0.19 0.19 0.20 5.87*** 0.86 4.27*** 
Bidder 37 0.05 0.01 0.25 1.25 0.57 0.66 
Combined 37 0.07 0.05 0.20 2.16** 0.70 2.30** 
Subsets According to Method of Paymentii       
  Cash-Financed Mergers         
Target 9 0.27 0.32 0.23 1.32 0.89 2.00 
Bidder 9 0.17 0.03 0.46 1.09 0.67 0.67 
Combined 9 0.17 0.05 0.36 1.39 0.78 0.78 
  Mixed-Financed Mergers         
Target 5 0.20 0.19 0.09 4.80 1.00 1.79 
Bidder 5 -0.02 0.00 0.11 0.43 0.60 0.00 
Combined 5 0.04 0.03 0.06 1.39 0.80 0.89 
 Stock-Financed Mergers        
Target 23 0.16 0.19 0.20 3.85*** 0.83 2.92*** 
Bidder 23 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.87 0.52 0.00 
Combined 23 0.04 0.06 0.12 1.71* 0.65 1.25 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using two-tailed test.  
 Table 1 (Continued)
Variables N 
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Abnormal 
Return 
Standard 
Deviation 
t-statistics 
 
Percentage of 
Firms with 
Positive 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Z-Statistics 
for 
Significance 
of Binomial 
Test 
Subsets According to Strategyi        
  High Overlap Mergers         
Target 21 0.14 0.19 0.20 3.34*** 0.81 2.62*** 
Bidder 21 0.08 0.04 0.32 1.16 0.57 0.44 
Combined 21 0.09 0.06 0.26 1.54 0.67 1.31 
  Low Overlap Mergers         
Target 16 0.25 0.22 0.19 5.41*** 0.94 3.25*** 
Bidder 16 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.57 0.56 0.25 
Combined 16 0.05 0.05 0.09 2.35** 0.75 1.75* 
Subsets According To Relative 
Price-To-Book Ratio Of Biddersiii        
  “Value” Mergers         
Target 11 0.25 0.22 0.15 5.45*** 1.00 3.02*** 
Bidder 11 0.16 0.04 0.42 1.27 0.64 0.60 
Combined 11 0.16 0.08 0.33 1.61 0.64 0.60 
  “Growth” Mergers         
Target 26 0.17 0.18 0.21 4.00*** 0.81 2.94*** 
Bidder 26 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.54 0.20 
Combined 26 0.03 0.05 0.10 1.70* 0.73 2.16** 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using two-tailed test.  
 
                                                 
 
 
